
L band, Ku band, Ka band: Aeronautical Applications, DO-160 Qualification, Certification, Regulation, and Standardization; Modeling; Testing; Cellular; Bluetooth; WiFi; Antenna; Beam Steering; Aero Performance - CFD; Link Budget;

I spoke to the APEX Technical Committee back in 2015 on Aviation Cybersecurity. What happened in the last 11 years? ARINC 848 Media Independent Secure Offboard Network (MISON) was published. ATN/IPS emerged as the sanctioned ACARS-over-IP protocol. VLAN ID has proliferated as a the preferred method for network slicing. Aviation-ISAC has remained the focal point for cybersecurity tactical coordination. Sadly, OpenSSID remains the standard for IFC Wi-Fi, with very good alternatives still on the bench. Occasional hiccups persist with EFB software, and its influence to aviation safety remains blurred on the edge.
Presented to the Performance-based Aviation Rulemaking Committee - Connectivity Working Group meeting #55 (PARC-CWG55). Thanks to Trey Turner (Southwest Airlines) and Kevin Kelley (FAA) for leading the three-day session. Also to L2 Aviation, especially Mark Lebovitz and Jim Nuse, for sponsoring the meeting at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport.
Video Link: https://youtu.be/66JK1Rudx9c
Installation of a two Ku/Ka-band satcom systems (KSAT) on airliners has become commonplace. Modems are being integrated into the Outside Antenna Equipment rather than in the Modman. These dynamics are opening the door to fail-operational (Fail-0p) KSAT. Fail-Op KSAT, in turn, opens the door to possible use as a required radio service (safety communications - ATC data link). That may provide for a tradeoff between installing a second L-band satcom (Viasat/Inmarsat or Iridium) and a second KSAT.
The Future of Connectivity: Airlines Examine the Critical Second Chapter for IFC
Sponsored by ST Engineering, iDirect
4 Dec 2024
Five airline leaders gathered with Mark Holmes, Senior Editorial Director, Via Satellite, for a one-hour webinar looking at the “second chapter” of inflight connectivity (IFC). I have summarized some of the conversation and added my own thoughts. The Seamless Air Alliance has an airline forum which meets monthly. I found the sentiments raised in the airline forum are very much aligned to what was expressed by panelists. Seamless Air Alliance uses the airline forum to set the agenda for all the work being conducted across the nine expert’s groups.
Inmarsat Aero Conference 2002
June 11-12, 2002
ICAO Conference Facility, Montreal, Canada
A time capsule, here are my notes from the annual Inmarsat Aero Conference, 2002. I was CTO for Tenzing Communications. This was a difficult time, following 9/11. Tenzing had downsized by 60%. We were focused on deploying Swift64, 64 kbps in either circuit switched or packet switched channels. Sorrow for all that have passed since then.
VoePass Flight 2Z2283 crashed south of Campinas, Brazil, on Friday, 9 May 2024, with 62 (previously reported 61) persons onboard. PZ-VPB was a 14 year old ATR 72-500 (72-212A).
Every search and rescue operation hopes to find survivors but, given the severity of the event, tragically, all lives were lost. Sorrow for the victims and those that loved them.
The flight was scheduled from Cascavul (CAC) to Sao Paulo (GRU).
Project Paper 793 is under development by the AEEC/SAE-ITC Ku/Ka-band Satcom Subcommittee. PP793 is the third generation satcom system, following ARINC 791 and ARINC 792. PP793 provides support for multibeam antennas through the use of fiber optic interconnections that replace all coaxial cables and quadrax (Ethernet) cables.
Aeronautical Communication is characterized in several different ways, which can get confusing. Follow along the avalanche of acronyms.
A Bombardier Challenger 300, N300ER, encountered an upset when the flight crew disconnected the autopilot while suffering from a nose-up mistrim situation. The mistrim was the result from a failure of the autopilot stabilizer trim control. The upset resulted in a roller coaster exceeding +4g and -2g, eventually brought under control by the flight crew. Tragically, a passenger was fatally injured in the upset.
Satshow 2023 is a gathering of service providers, equipment suppliers, technology wizards and a reunion of the many people involved in satellite communication. Held once again in the Washington Convention Center, the show runs four days long: Monday dedicated to lectures and an exhibit hall open Tuesday through Thursday, with speakers continuing alongside.
I was asked to speak to a group of engineers today. Here were the questions I was asked and my talking points. What did I miss?
I have deleted my account on Twitter (satcom_guru).
While I cannot support the platform, I am anxious to support the community that I have grown so fond of. This is my list of who I enjoyed from hearing from, learned from, or inspired me to jump into a new rabbit hole. This post will be updated frequently.
I intend to stay here on this site, but may also post occasionally at LinkedIn.
On 9 January 2021, a Boeing 737-500 aircraft, registration PK-CLC, was on a scheduled domestic flight, from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta, to Supadio International Airport (WIOO), Pontianak. PT Sriwijaya Air flight SJ182 crashed into the sea about five minutes later, with all 62 lives lost in the tragedy. Weather conditions for the mid-afternoon flight were not considered a factor.
The Captain was the pilot flying (PF). The 54 year old Captain had nearly 18,000 flight hours, over 9,000 in the 737. The 34 year old First Officer, pilot managing (PM), had over 5,000 flight hours, virtually all on the 737.
KNKT, Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi is the Indonesia Independent Investigation Authority also known as National Transportation Safety Committee / NTSC) released the final accident report on 10 Nov 2022.
Sriwijaya Air flight SJ182 crashed shortly after take off from Jakarta on 9 January 2021. The flight, operated by 737-500 registered PK-CLC, departed at 07:36 UTC (14:36 local time). The last ADS-B signal from the aircraft was received by Flightradar24 at 07:40 UTC (flightradar24.com).
The airplane appears to be destroyed on impact with all 62 lives lost.
Sorrow for the victims and for those that loved them.
Angle of Attack (AoA) is measured on the 737MAX using two AoA vanes, one installed on the left side of the airplane and the other on the right side. While each AoA vane is calibrated and precise, inferring AoA directly overlooks local aerodynamic factors that can cause the sensor reading to diverge from the desired value, notably with sideslip. A tolerance exists from what the AoA vane senses and the expected value. The question arises, how to manage AoA sensor tolerances or undesired behavior to maximize availability of desired functionality, while limiting exposure to undesired hazards?
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| Additional Modem Unit |
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| JT610 Final Report |
Manual Stabilizer TrimIf manual stabilizer trim is necessary, ensure both stabilizer trim cutout switches are in CUTOUT prior to extending the manual trim wheel handles.Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach. Configure the airplane early in the approach. When reaching the landing configuration, maintain as constant a trim setting as possible. If a go-around is required, anticipate the trim changes as airspeed increases.This is in a 737 QRH (Ref 9.15)
“A single point of failure is an absolute no-no,” said one former Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX"
"Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on designing the interfaces on the MAX’s flight deck, said managers mandated that any differences from the previous 737 had to be small enough that they wouldn’t trigger the need for pilots to undergo new simulator training."
"He said that if the group had built the MCAS in a way that would depend on two sensors, and would shut the system off if one fails, he thinks the company would have needed to install an alert in the cockpit to make the pilots aware that the safety system was off. And if that happens, Ludtke said, the pilots would potentially need training on the new alert and the underlying system. That could mean simulator time, which was off the table."
"Matt Menza, a former Boeing pilot who worked on the MAX, said that during flight testing of planes ready for delivery, he wasn’t aware of any events that indicated a problem with the stall warning or the MCAS system. But he said an ideal system would have been built on two angle-of-attack probes, so that a single bad value wouldn’t cause problems. Menza and two other pilots who have worked on the MAX said they were unaware that the system used only one AOA probe."

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| MCAS Commanded Stabilizer Trim Without Stopping |
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| http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e0070a070/$FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf |
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| IX611 Takeoff normal (A) and accident (X) |